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Abstract 
When used in the health care industry, an MFN clause is a contractual 
agreement that guarantees a health insurer the same best price as their 
market competitors.  MFN clauses have the effect of unnecessarily raising 
consumer costs, reducing choice among providers, constraining access to 
care and preventing the development of alternative health care delivery 
models.  The purpose of this paper is four-fold.  First, to design a four-
quadrant matrix to evaluate the pro-competitive and anticompetitive 
purposes and effects of MFN clauses under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Second, to defeat the jurisprudential presumption that MFN clauses are 
pro-competitive in the health care industry and to recommend that this 
presumption be abolished.  Third, to examine the U. S. Department of 
Justice’s paradigmatic shift over the last decade toward prosecuting large 
insurers who employ MFN clauses resulting in U.S. Consent Decrees.  
Fourth, to outline the indicia of a meritorious claim against an insurer who 
employs an MFN clause. 
INTRODUCTION  
A most favored nations (MFN) clause is a contractual agreement between a buyer 
and a seller stating that the price paid by the buyer will be at least as low as the price 
paid by other buyers who purchase the same commodities from the seller.2  In health 
care, the contract is typically between the health insurer who acts as the purchaser of 
health care services on behalf of its subscribers and the medical provider who acts as 
the seller of health care services.3  MFN clauses have also been dubbed prudent 
                                                                
 
2Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts 
Between Health Care Providers and Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
3Anthony Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses Under the Antitrust Laws, 20 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 821, 823 (1995) [hereinafter Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract 
Clauses]. 
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buyer clauses,4 price nondiscrimination clauses,5 usual fee-provisions,6 and most 
favored rate requirements.7 
Only a health insurer with sufficient market power can negotiate the 
incorporation of an MFN clause in consideration for the exchange of a relatively 
large volume of business in the relevant market.8  Typically, only one health insurer 
per market will secure provider contracts incorporating the MFN clause.  As an 
insurer with sufficient market power, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans started using 
MFN clauses in contracts with providers as a way to maintain market strength in the 
face of the emerging alternative health care delivery models like HMOs and PPOs.9  
The U.S. Government, corporations offering employer-based health insurance, and 
American citizens as consumers, all have reason for serious concern regarding the 
anticompetitive nature of MFN clauses.  These clauses have the effect of 
unnecessarily raising consumer costs, reducing choice among providers, constraining 
access to care, and preventing the development of alternative health care delivery 
models.   
The purpose of this paper is four-fold.  First, to design a four-quadrant matrix to 
evaluate the pro-competitive and anticompetitive purposes and effects of MFN 
clauses under the “rule of reason” standard of review where a violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act is alleged.  Second, to defeat the jurisprudential presumption that 
MFN clauses are pro-competitive in the health care industry and recommend that the 
presumption be abolished in health care cases.  Third, to examine the U. S. 
Department of Justice’s paradigmatic shift over the last decade toward prosecuting 
large insurers who employ MFN clauses resulting in U.S. Consent Decrees for 
Sherman Act Section 1 violations.  Fourth, to outline the indicia of a meritorious 
claim against an insurer who employs an MFN clause in an agreement with medical 
providers. 
I.  THE SHERMAN ACT 
Most complaints alleging antitrust violations involving MFN clauses are brought 
under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Section 1 claims are either examined 
under the per se rule or the rule of reason.  The court decides which rule to use on a 
case-by-case basis, applying the facts of the case to guiding precedent.  First, the 
court examines the language of the Sherman Act and how courts have interpreted 
and applied it.  Second, a Sherman Act Section 1 violation where the court applies 
                                                                
 
4Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 
1101 (1st Cir. 1989). 
5Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich. v. Michigan Ass’n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Michigan Ass’n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 118 Mich. App. 505, 325 N.W.2d 471 (1982). 
6Madden v. California Dental Serv., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67, 176 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
1986). 
7United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio, 
E. Div.). 
8Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 823. 
9Id. at 823; & n.14.  
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the rule of reason is more meritorious because the MFN clause can produce 
anticompetitive effects which unreasonably restrain trade through a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy.  Third, the court’s reasoning in Ocean State, where the 
plaintiff failed on the merits to establish an unlawful monopoly under Section 2 of 
the Act highlights an important distinction between Section 1 versus Section 2 
claims. 
First, regarding Section 1 violations, the Sherman Act states that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal.”10  Because any agreement concerning trade can restrain competition, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1 to “render unlawful only those restraints 
that unreasonably restrict competition.”11  
Whether an agreement unreasonably restrains trade is traditionally analyzed 
under either the per se rule or the rule of reason standard of review.  If a “practice 
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output” rather than “one designed to ‘increase economic 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive,’” it is deemed “per 
se illegal.”12  The per se rule disregards the defendant’s market power, illicit purpose, 
and the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.13  Application of the per se rule as 
the standard of review is generally limited to claims involving horizontal price-fixing 
or market allocation agreements among competitors.14  Generally, all other Section 1 
claims are reviewed under the rule of reason. 
The Delta Dental court articulated a rationale for applying the rule of reason to a 
Section 1 claim as opposed to the per se rule.  In Delta Dental, the thrust of the 
government’s complaint centered on the anticompetitive effect on price to the market 
as a whole, realized through market foreclosure of reduced fee plans by new market 
entrants, the inability of existing plans to offer lower fee alternatives, and the 
maintenance or increase in consumer prices.15  The court reasoned that applying the 
per se rule to these allegations would “contradict the Sherman Act’s animating 
concern of protecting consumers from high prices.”16  Rather, the court only 
conducts a balancing test, where it weighs the anticompetitive effects of the 
agreements against their legitimate business justifications (i.e. pro-competitive 
purposes and effects) under the rule of reason.17   
                                                                
 
10Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
11United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996). 
12Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20, 99 S. Ct. 1551, 1562-63, 60 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1979).  
13Delta Dental, 943 F. Supp. at 186 (citing U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 
F.2d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1993)).  
14Delta Dental, 943 F.Supp. at 186.  
15Id. at 191. 
16Id.  
17Id. 
2003-04] HOW MFN CLAUSES USED 33 
 
Under the rule of reason, this balancing test determines whether the plaintiff has 
met his burden of proof that the “anticompetitive effects of the agreements outweigh 
their legitimate business justifications.”18  The inquiry focuses on whether the 
restraint on competition impacts the market as a whole.19  As such, an agreement is 
not an unreasonable restraint on trade merely because it injures a competitor.20  
Rather, the agreement becomes an unreasonable restraint only when it “causes 
detriment to the competitive process” on the market as a whole.21  Therefore, only 
unreasonable restraints on trade which affect the market generally are prohibited 
under the rule of reason.   
While a court will hear a Sherman Act Section 1 claim alleging anticompetitive 
purposes and/or anticompetitive effects, prevailing appears more likely when the 
evidence shows sufficient anticompetitive effects.  The primary reason prevailing on 
the merits improves where anticompetitive effects are shown lies in the balancing 
test employed by the courts under the rule of reason.  The pro-competitive purposes 
and effects are weighed against the anticompetitive purposes and effects.  If the 
anticompetitive effects, therefore, are not yet recognized in the market, then only the 
anti competitive purpose weighs in the balance.  It follows that the plaintiff who can 
prove actual anticompetitive effects caused by the competitor’s MFN clause 
possesses a greater likelihood of succeeding on the merits, as opposed to a plaintiff 
alleging mere anticompetitive purposes. Put differently, actual negative 
anticompetitive effects must be felt by the market as a whole for the plaintiff to tip 
the balance and overcome the presumption of pro-competitive conduct.22 
Second, regarding Section 2 violations, the First Circuit in Ocean State stated 
that the monopolization claim under the Sherman Act Section 2 requires:  “(1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”23  While 
                                                                
 
18Id. at 186 (citing Monahan’s Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 526-27 
(1st Cir. 1989)).   
19Delta Dental, 943 F. Supp. at 186 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 691 n.17, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 n.17, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978)). 
20Id. at 186 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20, 82 S. Ct. 
1502, 1521, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962)).   
21Id. at 186 (citing Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st 
Cir. 1988)).   
22The U.S. Government has entered into five separate consent decrees with defendants 
who used MFN clauses, or their equivalent, where actual anticompetitive effects were in 
evidence. See Consent Decrees: United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 1997-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 71,860 (D.R.I. 1997); United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio, E. Div.); United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 71,404 (D.D.C. 1996); United States v. Oregon Dental Serv., 1995-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 71,062 (D. Or. 1995); United States v. Delta Dental Plan of Ariz., 1995-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 71,048 (D. Ariz. 1995). 
23Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 
1101, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
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an MFN clause may eliminate competition to the degree that the dominant insurer 
has effectively created a monopsony, the Section 2 inquiry fails to examine the most 
salient features of the MFN clause’s effect on competition.  The operation of the 
MFN clause on market competition better fits with Section 1 analysis where the 
MFN clause may operate to unreasonably restrain trade with anticompetitive effects 
on the market as a whole through a contract, combination, or conspiracy.  Moreover, 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Government has entered five separate U.S. 
Consent Decrees subsequent to filing a complaint alleging Sherman Act Section 1 
violations as opposed to Section 2 violations.24   
Third, although Ocean State primarily involves a Sherman Act Section 2 
challenge, the court’s reasoning is instructive on several points because the Ocean 
State clause is identical to Delta Dental’s MFN clause.25  The Ocean State court 
observed that Section 2 prohibits “‘exclusionary’ conduct by a monopoly, often 
defined as ‘behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but 
also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way.’”26  The court concluded that the MFN clause “was a 
bona fide policy to ensure that Blue Cross would not pay more than any competitor 
for the same services.”27  The First Circuit in Ocean State stated that “the MFN 
clause’s insistence on a supplier’s lowest price, absent pricing that is either predatory 
or below the supplier’s incremental cost, ‘tends to further competition on the merits 
and as a mater of law, is not exclusionary.’”28  
Ocean State loses on their Section 2 claim against Blue Cross alleging an 
unlawful monopsony on judgment.  In contrast, the United States survives Delta 
Dental’s motion to dismiss its Section 1 claim; Delta Dental subsequently enters a 
U.S. Consent Decree agreement.29  Therefore, framing the issue as a Section 2 claim 
requires the plaintiff who is challenging an MFN clause to prove too much.  
Excluding competitors from the market place through monopolization under Section 
2 is a much higher evidentiary threshold to meet and is different in character from 
proving an unlawful restraint on trade through contract, combination, or conspiracy. 
Therefore, in alleging a Sherman Act Section 1 claim where the court applies the 
rule of reason, the antitrust plaintiff who can prove actual anticompetitive effects 
caused by the competitor’s MFN clause, possesses a greater likelihood of succeeding 
on the merits, as opposed to a plaintiff who alleges a Section 2 monopsony claim.  
While an antitrust plaintiff challenging an MFN clause may under some 
circumstances be able to prove a Section 2 claim, and therefore assert both 
allegations as separate kinds of unlawful conduct, further discussion of Section 2 
claims is beyond the scope of this paper.  
                                                                
 
24See supra note 22. 
25Delta Dental, 943 F. Supp. at 187. 
26Id. at 188. 
27Id.  
28Id.  
29United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,860 (D.R.I. 1997).   
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II.  THE BALANCING TEST UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 
Under a Sherman Act Section 1 claim where the court applies the rule of reason, 
the court will weigh all of the evidence the parties present regarding the MFN 
clause’s pro-competitive purposes, pro-competitive effects, anticompetitive 
purposes, and anticompetitive effects.  A four-quadrant matrix is designed to aid in 
analyzing and evaluating the merits of a Sherman Act Section 1 violation.30  This 
paper examines case law, economic principles, and entertains new insights regarding 
the competitive nature of MFN clauses in health care. 
A.  Quadrant I:  Pro-competitive Purposes   
1.  Guard Against Discriminatory Pricing 
First, an insurer with sufficient bargaining power uses an MFN clause to guard 
against discriminatory pricing in the market, effectively promoting competition.31  A 
narrow price differential among competitors in the marketplace may facilitate 
competition in other aspects of the product or service.  In the health care industry, 
access to care, the number and location of physicians in the panel, wellness and 
holistic medicine alternatives, hassle-free payment of medical claims, case 
management, and overall quality of care arguably may gain importance in the market 
when the range in the price paid to medical providers is narrow.  Therefore, by 
clustering prices, the MFN clause may stimulate market competition in product 
design and service delivery.   
2.  Tool to Secure Volume Discounts 
Second, MFN clauses are just the tool used in the industry to secure the favorably 
low price typically granted to the large buyer as a volume discount.32  Judge Posner 
in the Marshfield Clinic case calls MFN clauses “standard devices” buyers use to 
bargain for low prices by requiring the seller to treat them as any other buyer.33  
Therefore, using an MFN clause to guard against discriminatory pricing and to 
                                                                
 
30See Table 1. 
31See Susan E. Stenger, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Monopsonistic Power: An 
Unhealthy Mix?, 15 AM.  J.L. & MED. 111, 115 (1989). 
32Anthony J. Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nation Contract 
Clauses in Managed Care and Health Insurance Contracts, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (1995) 
[hereinafter Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects]. 
33Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 
1995).  Compcare, the Blue Cross HMO subsidiary, alleged collusion and price-fixing 
between Marshfield Clinic and her affiliated physicians.  Compcare argued that the Clinic had 
an agreement under which the Clinic would not pay the affiliated physicians more than what 
these physicians charge their other patients.   Compcare argued that this agreement “put a floor 
underneath these physicians’ prices.”  The physician affiliates were penalized for accepting 
lower prices from other patients because the Clinic rate automatically declined to the lowest 
price offered to any competitor.  Justice Posner called this most favored nation clause 
argument “ingenious but perverse.”  He acknowledged the Department of Justice’s position 
that these clauses are “misused to anticompetitive ends” in some cases, but maintains no such 
evidence exists in this case. 
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secure favorable prices as a volume discount has been viewed by courts to fulfill pro-
competitive purposes. 
B.  Quadrant III:  Pro-competitive Effects 
Two potentially pro-competitive effects of MFN clauses are lower prices overall 
because discounts will be given to all buyers and a guarantee to buyers that they are 
receiving the same best price.34   
1.  Lower Prices Overall 
The Kartell court considered the fact that the prices at issue were low prices, not 
high prices.  The First Circuit declared that “the Congress that enacted the Sherman 
Act saw it as a way of protecting consumers against prices that were too high, not too 
low.”35  Therefore, the pro-competitive effect of lowering prices to a point which is 
not so low as to constitute predatory pricing presumptively benefits the buyer and 
stimulates price competition in the market.   
2.  Guarantee the Same Best Price 
The First Circuit echoed the principle again in Ocean State concluding that the 
buyer’s insistence on a supplier’s lowest price through the use of an MFN clause, 
absent predatory pricing, “tends to further competition on the merits and, as a matter 
of law, is not exclusionary.”36  Therefore, if the MFN clause operates to lower prices 
to consumers, then a court may find that this pro-competitive effect is a reasonable 
restraint on trade because it benefits consumers.   
C.  Quadrant II:  Anticompetitive Purposes 
The MFN clause can exert anticompetitive purposes which create an artificial 
price floor for medical services and establish price certainty in the market.  The 
device can, in effect, harm the market by unnecessarily increasing competitor’s costs 
for similar products and services.  If an artificial price floor and price certainty 
actually results in higher prices to consumers, then the MFN device can be viewed as 
an anticompetitive method to restrain trade to the detriment of consumers. 
1.  Creating an Artificial Price Floor   
The insurer who imposes the MFN clause possesses market power and intends to 
maintain or increase their market dominance.37  The MFN clause can create an 
artificial price floor that the MFN insurer regulates.  Because the MFN insurer 
essentially controls the price, it can manipulate prices up or down.   
But why would the MFN insurer, as a rational buyer, want to raise the price it is 
willing to pay its medical providers?  The answer is the realization of an overall 
                                                                
 
34Celnicker, supra note 2, at 880. 
35Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. den., 471 
U.S. 1029, 105 S. Ct. 2040, 85 L.Ed.2d 322.   
36Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R. I., 883 F.2d 
1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027, 110 S. Ct. 1473, 108 L.Ed.2d 610 (1990). 
37Stenger, supra note 31, at 115. 
2003-04] HOW MFN CLAUSES USED 37 
 
increase in net earnings for the insurer.  The MFN insurer can increase its net 
earnings by raising the price it pays to medical providers, and correspondingly the 
proportional rate it charges its subscribers while maintaining (rather than increasing) 
its profit margin and maintaining (rather than reducing) its operational efficiency.  
Because increasing profit margins may be negatively perceived by consumers, and 
reducing operational efficiency may be negatively perceived by shareholders, the 
MFN insurer strikes the best balance of increasing its net profits while avoiding both 
market pitfalls.  
First, from an accounting perspective, when an expense (i.e., a liability) is 
increased, a corresponding increase in an asset must occur to balance the books.  If 
the MFN insurer increases its expenses by raising the price it pays medical providers 
for their services, it is at least plausible that it will correspondingly raise a particular 
asset, namely its enrollment subscription revenue, to balance the books.  This 
anticompetitive purpose harms its own enrollees, as well as its competitor’s 
enrollees, by unnecessarily raising prices in the absence of competition.  This in 
itself, however, does not explain the reason the rational buyer wants to raise the price 
paid to medical providers and raise the cost charged to its subscribers.  Why, then, is 
this behavior rational for the MFN buyer?  First, the increase in gross revenue 
generates an increase in net revenue without raising marginal profit.  The percentage 
of marginal profits remains the same, but the net effect can be a substantial increase 
in net profits that could largely go undetected by the industry and the courts as 
anticompetitive in nature.   
For example, if an insurer currently has one billion dollars in gross revenue, with 
a twenty-five percent profit margin, the insurer has two hundred fifty million in net 
profits.  If the insurer increases its expenses paid to medical providers by just one 
percent, and correspondingly increases its subscriber enrollment fees by just one 
percent, the new gross revenue is one billion, ten million.  If the same twenty-five 
percent profit margin is maintained, the new net profit is two hundred fifty-two 
million, five hundred thousand, an increase of two and a half million in net profit.  A 
one percent increase in pricing, even if detected, would not typically be viewed as 
having an anticompetitive purpose or effect on the market.  As such, the MFN 
insurer raises the price paid to medical providers which justifies raising the cost paid 
by its subscribers.  All the while, the subscribers are completely unaware that their 
MFN insurer controlled the price and orchestrated an unnecessary two and a half 
million dollar increase in health care costs to its subscribers.  Moreover, the increase 
in price paid by the MFN buyer may in effect raise the floor of the price paid by 
other buyers in the market causing a ripple effect of unnecessarily raising consumer 
prices in the whole market.  Therefore, the MFN buyer can effectively manipulate 
the price floor by unnecessarily raising prices, which has the anticompetitive effect 
of artificially increasing prices to consumers without any material change in products 
or services.   
Furthermore, this anticompetitive conduct can have a ripple effect on the entire 
industry.  A medical provider must raise the price at which it sells its services to all 
other non-favored buyers to at least the same price paid to the favored insurer or 
violate the MFN clause.   The additional, more far-reaching anticompetitive effect is 
an unnecessary price increase to the entire market without any material change in 
products or services.  The severe anticompetitive effects of an unnecessary price 
increase of even one percent on the entire health care industry without any material 
benefit to consumers is an unreasonable restraint on trade.  Therefore, the real 
38 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 18:29 
perversity of the MFN clause is the creation of an appearance of “rising health care 
costs” across the entire industry, where the MFN clause coercively operates to 
unnecessarily raise prices by even one percent. 
Second, if the MFN insurer opted to raise the price charged to its subscribers 
without raising the price paid to medical providers (an expense) as described above, 
then it would have to raise a different expense to make the books balance.  Expenses 
include direct expenses and indirect expenses.  While direct expenses include 
medical provider expenses, for our purposes, indirect expenses generally include 
administrative overhead expenses.  The MFN insurer could raise solely their indirect 
expenses rather than passing the price increase to the medical provider.  If the 
administrative overhead for this insurer already sits near the top of the range when 
compared to other insurers, then the MFN insurer has a huge disincentive to 
categorize the expense as administrative overhead because they already appear 
economically inefficient relative to their competitors.  Even if the MFN insurer’s 
administrative overhead is in the mid-range, an increase in indirect overhead 
expenses may indicate operational inefficiency to shareholders.  Because higher 
administrative overhead generally indicates economic inefficiency in delivering 
insurance to its subscribers and value to its stockholders, the stock’s market value 
could decline.  Therefore, the MFN insurer is more likely to raise the price it pays 
medical providers than increase administrative overhead to avoid the public 
perception of being economically inefficient.   
2.  Price Certainty   
The medical provider, as a profit-maximizing seller, might willingly embrace an 
MFN clause with the anticompetitive purpose that restrains their own freedom to 
discount to MFN rivals and establishes price certainty.38  The direct effect of 
discounting to rivals would be to reduce the medical provider’s profits, unless the 
lower prices attracted a sufficient number of new customers to offset the reduced 
revenues caused by the lowering of the MFN insurer’s price.39  The medical 
provider, albeit in a perverse manner of negotiation, can now say to all market rivals 
that he is unable to extend a discount because of the MFN agreement.  In effect, the 
medical provider essentially locks-in the lowest price at which he is willing to sell 
his services, thereby establishing price certainty in the market.  It follows that price 
uncertainty, which can destabilize oligopolistic pricing, is reduced by 
implementation of an MFN clause.40  Therefore, if the MFN clause operates to create 
an artificial price floor with the purpose of establishing price certainty, and the effect 
is an increase in price to consumers, then the anticompetitive nature of the clause 
unreasonably restrains trade to the detriment of consumers. 
                                                                
 
38See In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev’d sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1984).  Oligopolistic pricing would be stabilized by an 
MFN clause.  The manufacturer can justify rejecting a request for discount based on the 
requirement that it would have to extend the discount to all of its customers.  See also United 
States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,404 (D.D.C. 1996).   
39Celnicker, supra note 2, at 866.  See United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,404 (D.D.C. 1996). 
40Celnicker, supra note 2, at 866.  (Analyzing FTC’s argument In re Ethyl Corp., the 
Second Circuit reversed against FTC on grounds of insufficient evidence). 
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D.  Quadrant IV:  Anticompetitive Effects   
MFN clauses may “eliminate a dynamic mechanism by which prices are 
ratcheted down to the competitive level, reduce [output of medical services], and 
prevent the market from rewarding more efficient distribution systems.”41  
Anticompetitive effects may include: horizontal price-fixing, unreasonable restraints 
on vertical trade, elimination of price discrimination, preempting a genuine market 
floor price, deterrence of new market entrants, elimination or crippling of existing 
smaller insurers, preventing development of lower-cost plans, depriving the market 
of innovative and alternative service delivery models, and depriving consumers of 
differentiated products. 
1.  Horizontal Price-fixing   
Using an MFN clause within one industry raises the possibility of a Sherman Act 
Section 1 violation for horizontal price-fixing because consumers are deprived of the 
benefits of price competition.42  Prices are fixed when they are agreed upon.  Thus, 
any agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform prices constitutes an unlawful price-
fixing agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.43  Furthermore, price-sharing 
may be viewed by the Antitrust Division as circumstantial evidence of price-fixing.44 
                                                                
 
41Celnicker, supra note 2, at 884. 
42Stenger, supra note 31, at 114-15. 
4315 U.S.C.A. § 1.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 84 L.Ed. 
1129, 60 S. Ct. 811, reh. den., 310 U.S. 658, 84 L.Ed. 1421, 60 S. Ct. 1091; see also 54 AM. 
JUR. 2d § 71.  “Since any interference with the setting of prices by free market forces is 
unlawful, conspirators do not have to adopt rigid prices in order to be guilty of price fixing.  
Rather, a combination to maintain prices is nonetheless a violation of the Act even though the 
prices are not fixed in the sense that they are uniform and inflexible, if the range within which 
purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if the prices paid or charged are to be at a 
certain level or on ascending or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or, if by various 
formulae, they are related to the market prices.  Thus, price fixing encompasses any agreement 
to raise or lower prices, as well as any agreement which creates potential power for price 
maintenance exhibited by its actual exertion for that purpose.  Stabilizing prices as well as 
raising them is within the ban of Section 1, because in terms of market operations, 
stabilization is but one form of manipulation.  Pursuant to Section 1, therefore, a combination 
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or 
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate commerce is illegal per se, whatever 
machinery is employed by the combination to achieve such a result.” 
44Kip Sturgis, Esq., N.C. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Health Care Antitrust 
Seminar guest lecturer discussed the evidentiary use of price-sharing.  March 18 (2003).   See 
United States v. Delta Dental Plan of Ariz., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,048 (D. Ariz. 
1995) (Under a U.S. Consent Decree, Delta Dental of Arizona is enjoined from “[e]xamining, 
auditing, or monitoring the fees a dentist charges to any other dental plan or to any person 
other than a Delta Dental Plan participant [and from] [s]ending written communication to 
dentists regarding the fees dentists charge to persons or dental plans other than Defendant’s.”  
See also United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,404 (D.D.C. 
1996).  Defendant is similarly enjoined from monitoring and auditing fees doctor’s charge 
other providers. 
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2.  Unreasonably Restrains Vertical Trade   
While inter-market MFN clauses, regulated by the government, promote 
competition and free markets, intra-market use of MFN clauses, coerced by market 
buyers, defeat competition and restrain trade.45  Typically, only an insurer with 
sufficient market power can secure an MFN agreement.46  During negotiations, an 
insurer with sufficient market power can threaten to take its business elsewhere 
unless the medical provider agrees to the MFN clause.   
Under economic theory, the medical provider, called the rational seller, naturally 
wants to maximize patient volume and revenue and avoid losing his largest 
customer.  As a result, the rational seller frequently succumbs to the threat and signs 
the agreement including the MFN clause.  The medical provider must then decline 
all agreements with all other insurers at lower prices than the MFN contract price, 
lest the provider suffer the penalty of a fee reduction from the MFN insurer. The 
smaller insurers, therefore, are effectively blocked from competing on price against 
the MFN insurer who already has sufficient market power.  Regardless of whether 
the smaller insurer operates with greater economic efficiency or is willing to earn a 
smaller marginal profit, the smaller insurer faces an insurmountable barrier to 
competition.  The MFN contract clause establishes an artificial price floor under 
which the smaller provider cannot venture to compete.47  The smaller insurer can 
neither gain market share through lowering its price, nor benefit from economic 
efficiency in its operations or innovation in restructuring its enrollees’ health plans.  
As a case in point, Delta Dental argued that it did not engage in horizontal price-
fixing stating its “MFN clause does not prohibit participating dentists from charging 
lower or higher prices to non-Delta subscribers.”48  The government, however, 
attacked the MFN clause not for its anticompetitive purpose through horizontal 
price-fixing, but rather for its anticompetitive effect through vertically restraining 
trade.49  The government alleged that the MFN clause’s anticompetitive effects, 
“magnified by Delta’s market power, have been to freeze out reduced fee plans from 
the market, prevent existing plans from offering lower fee options, and, as a result, 
keep prices higher than would be without the clause.”50 
The anticompetitive effect of the MFN clause operates to erect a wall against free 
trade.51   
                                                                
 
45Stenger, supra note 31, at 111-113. 
46Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 32, at 72. 
47See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 
United States Department of Justice, to Cynthia M. Maleski, Commissioner, Pennsylvania 
Department of Insurance (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with Anthony J. Dennis). 
48United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D. R.I. 1996). 
49Id. 
50Id. at 191. 
5115 U.S.C.A § 1.  Vertical agreements on resale prices are illegal per se under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.  See 54 AM. JUR. 2d § 77.  Application of the rule applies regardless of 
whether the agreements involve the setting of minimum or maximum prices or whether they 
are written or can be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances. 
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Rather than breaking down trade barriers, as evidenced in the history of 
international trade, intra-market use of MFN clauses in the health care industry have 
the deleterious effect of creating barriers to free trade.52  Therefore, MFN clauses 
unreasonably restrain vertical trading in the health care market and have the negative 
effects of depriving the market of lower prices, increased operational efficiencies, 
product differentiation, and service delivery innovation. 
3.  Elimination of Price Discrimination 
Why would a medical provider discriminate in price against the dominant insurer 
by offering a lower price to a small competitor if the MFN clause did not forbid it?  
The answer lies in basic economic principles underlying the interplay between 
operational capacity and profitability. A rational seller, the medical provider, would 
discriminate against its largest buyer and not offer it the best price absent the MFN 
clause.  If a medical provider is working at full capacity serving the dominant 
insurer, the medical provider has nothing to gain by lowering its price and, therefore, 
would not price discriminate.53  If, however, the medical provider has excess 
capacity, the provider can increase its profits by serving additional patients at a lower 
price so long as that price exceeds its marginal opportunity cost.54   
Whenever the dominant insurer fails to supply enough patients to the medical 
provider to achieve one hundred percent of its operational capacity, the medical 
provider increases its overall profitability by selling any of its excess capacity at any 
price that exceeds its marginal cost.  The medical provider functions as a rational 
seller by engaging in price discrimination against its largest supplier when it merely 
offers a lower price to smaller competitors to fill its excess capacity.  The MFN 
clause, however, coercively operates to prevent the medical provider from 
maximizing its profitability by selling its excess capacity at a lower price.  
Furthermore, it restrains new market entrants or smaller existing competitors from 
soaking up the excess capacity at a bargain price and passing the savings on to its 
subscribers.  The MFN clause undermines the operation of free markets by 
preventing rational sellers from selling their excess capacity to market competitors 
who are willing to purchase the excess capacity at discounted rates and pass the 
savings on to consumers.55   
Price discrimination, in effect, promotes competition in the marketplace through 
establishing pricing equilibrium.  In a competitive market, absent restraints on price 
                                                                
 
52See Stenger, supra note 31, at 113. 
53Celnicker, supra note 2, at 880. 
54Id.  
55See United States v. Delta Dental Plan of Ariz., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,048 (D. 
Ariz. 1995).  Under a U.S. Consent Decree, Delta Dental of Arizona is enjoined from “[t]aking 
any other action, directly or indirectly, to coerce any dentist to refrain from offering discount 
fees to any person or dental plan within the State of Arizona or to refrain from participating in 
any dental plan, or to discourage any dentist from offering discount fees or participating in any 
dental plan.”  See also United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,404 
(D.D.C. 1996).  Defendant is similarly enjoined and restrained from taking any action to 
discourage doctors from participating in rival plans and offering or charging lower fees to rival 
plans. 
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induced through MFN clauses, the price that excess capacity is sold at establishes the 
genuine price floor for medical services.  The excess capacity price in a free market, 
therefore, is the lowest price at which the seller is willing or able to sell his medical 
services.  Because the MFN clause operates to prevent an otherwise free market from 
establishing a lower price paid by smaller insurance competitors, and ultimately 
lower prices paid by consumers, the MFN clause unreasonably restrains trade in the 
market as a whole with detrimental effects on the price to consumers. 
As a result, the dominant insurer controls market supply by preventing 
discounted sell-off of excess capacity.  The MFN clause operates to prevent price 
discrimination and control output (supply)56 by putting a choke-hold on the natural 
dynamic of the market where excess capacity is ordinarily sold at a cheaper price to 
competitors.57  In effect, the MFN clause prevents a natural lowering of prices that 
otherwise occurs in a competitive market.   
4.  Preempts a Genuine Market Floor Price 
The perception that the dominant insurer in the market should always receive the 
lowest price in exchange for the large volume of business it extends is a fallacy.  
From an economic perspective, price is tied to the relative elasticity of demand for 
services.  For example, traditional BCBS plans frequently enjoy sufficient market 
power, generally are open to dealing with all providers, and contract with a large 
percentage of all medical providers in their markets to serve their subscribers.58  In 
contrast, a relatively small HMO or PPO adequately serves its subscribers with 
relatively few providers.59  An insurer demanding coverage for a larger volume of 
business has less elasticity in making purchasing decisions based on price because it 
is confounded by its commitment to provide access to medical care for a large 
volume of patients.  Conversely, an insurer demanding coverage for a relatively 
small volume of business has more elasticity in making purchasing decisions based 
on price because its commitment to provide care through a closed panel of a few 
physicians allows it to move its business to obtain the best price.60   
The small insurer can select only those providers who have excess capacity and 
are willing to discount their fees to maximize their efficiency and profitability.61  In 
contrast, the largest insurer is at a disadvantage in securing the lowest price in the 
                                                                
 
56Celnicker, supra note 2, at 884. 
57While the MFN clause’s control over excess capacity or total volume of output may 
appear to have the benign or even desirable effect of indirectly controlling utilization of 
medical services of existing subscribers, a much greater deleterious effect may result.  If the 
excess capacity or output were not restrained by the clause, this output could, at least 
theoretically, be used to create a low-cost/low-benefit option for some currently uninsured 
consumers.  Kip Sturgis, Esq., N.C. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Health Care Antitrust 
Seminar guest lecturer on March 18, 2003, concurred in the merits of this argument and the 
potential anticompetitive effect.  
58Celnicker, supra note 2, at 882.  
59Id. 
60Id. 
61Id. 
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free market because it is not typically negotiating contracts for excess capacity where 
the rational seller is more willing to discount price to marginally increase 
productivity and profitability.  Smaller buyers with relatively elastic demand are 
more sensitive to price, and in response to price fluctuations, will change their 
buying decisions to a greater degree than larger buyers with relatively inelastic 
demand.62   
As a result, the larger buyer with relatively inelastic demand, who has less overall 
flexibility in meeting its contractual commitment to provide access to medical 
services to its larger volume of subscribers, is less capable of responding to higher 
prices by shifting its business to other sellers.  In a free market, price discrimination 
operates on relative elasticity in demand as well as excess capacity.  Therefore, 
medical providers acting as rational sellers, who possess excess capacity, have a 
strong incentive to maximize their profitability by offering discounts on a small 
portion of their business to maximize efficiency by selling to a subgroup of buyers in 
a market whose subscribers desire the lower price in exchange for a limited choice 
between medical providers.  The large insurer, however, may perceive that such 
adverse price discrimination places it at a competitive disadvantage which stimulates 
its desire to employ a device, the MFN clause, to defeat price competition.63   
5.  Deters New Market Entrants   
“Normally the choice of what to seek and buy and what to offer to pay is the 
buyer’s.”64  As one of the first courts to consider the potential anticompetitive effects 
of MFN clauses, the Reazin court, explored how the clause operated as a disincentive 
for medical providers to discount price to smaller competitors.65  If the medical 
provider cannot balance the discount offered to the non-favored competitor with 
enough volume to offset the effects of the large volume of the favored insurer’s 
corresponding reduction in price, then the medical provider will not offer a discount 
to the smaller competitor.66  Therefore, the disincentive to discount, in effect, makes 
market entry by new competitors more difficult because new entrants are restrained 
from competing with price discounts to gain market share. 
Moreover, the classic behavior of new market entrants includes a willingness to 
lower prices to gain market share.67  The MFN insurer as a rational buyer, who 
possesses dominant market power, may not need to lower its price to the lowest level 
to maintain or even increase its market share because it enjoys other benefits of 
market power including efficiencies achieved through economies of scale, brand 
recognition, and the stability of consumer habits.  Arguably, as the largest volume 
insurer, the dominant insurer through economies of scale may pay a marginally 
                                                                
 
62Id. 
63See id.  
64Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 923, 929 (1st Cir. 1984).  
65Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951 (10th  Cir. 1990), cert. den., 
110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990). 
66Id. 
67Stenger, supra note 31, at 115. 
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higher price to medical providers while still remaining competitive in the ultimate 
price offered to consumers.  The dominant insurer, however, argues that it is entitled 
to receive the most favorable price because it sends the greatest volume of business 
to the medical provider.  But, the argument is unsupported by the economic effects 
on competition.  Even a relatively higher price paid to the medical provider, does not 
necessarily render the dominant insurer less competitive to a medical provider or to 
its subscribers.   
First, if the dominant insurer is able to pay a higher price to the medical provider, 
while maintaining its competitive price ultimately paid by subscribers, then medical 
providers will be more interested in securing contracts with the dominant insurer.  As 
a rational seller, the medical provider welcomes business which pays him more for 
similar services.  Arguably, the dominant insurer could bargain for value-added 
products and services because of the higher price it pays.  The leverage of the large 
volume of business and higher relative price paid for a similar service, combined 
with the medical providers’ natural inclination to improve the health status of 
patients, stimulates a climate where ingenuity creates new products and models for 
delivering quality care.  The value-added services can give the dominant market 
insurer a remarkable competitive advantage in differentiating its products and 
services in aspects other than price.  Therefore, the use of an MFN clause by the 
dominant insurer may unreasonably restrain trade because the MFN insurer prevents 
new insurers from entering the market. 
6.  Eliminates or Cripples Existing Smaller Competitors   
In dictum, the Delta Dental Court described the adverse impact on the consumer.  
The MFN clause causes participating dentists to be unwilling to contract with other 
plans at reduced fees.68  The anticompetitive punch felt in the market is that existing 
competing plans have not expanded into lower price options and new reduced-fee 
plans have been precluded from entering the market.  The Delta Dental court found 
that the net effect was a “detrimental impact on the dental market without any 
discernable competitive benefits.”69 
7.  Prevents Development of Lower-cost Plans   
The complaint against Medical Mutual alleged that the insurer unreasonably 
restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act Section 1 by requiring hospitals, as 
sellers, to sign most favored rates (MFR) clauses. Specifically, the United States 
alleged that this MFR clause “stifled the development of innovative and less costly 
health plans.”70 
Furthermore, the Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study 
Antitrust Laws concluded that “a seller constrained by law to reduce prices to some 
                                                                
 
68See United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,404 (D.D.C. 
1996).  Competitors have been unable to obtain or retain a sufficient number of optometrists at 
competitive prices.  MFN clause has effectively deprived vision care consumers of the benefits 
of free and open competition and deprived the uninsured patients of price competition as well. 
69United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 943 F. Supp. 172, 192 (D.R.I., 1996). 
70United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio 
1999). 
2003-04] HOW MFN CLAUSES USED 45 
 
only at the cost of reducing prices to all may well end up reducing them to none.”71  
MFN clauses, in effect, prevent price competition; therefore, MFN clauses are the 
antithesis of competition as this device operates to inhibit lowering of prices and 
facilitates tacit collusion.72  Additionally, an MFN clause places greater limitations 
on competitive pricing responses and is more likely to lead to price uniformity.73 
8.  Deprives the Market of Innovative and Alternative Service Delivery Models   
Blue Cross and Blue Shield’s (BCBS) market power in the health care industry 
was threatened seriously upon the emergence of HMOs and PPOs.74  In response to 
the threat to BCBS’s traditional plans, BCBS launched a counter-attack by requiring 
its providers to sign MFN clauses.  The MFN clauses, in effect, prohibited medical 
providers from granting and alternative delivery systems from receiving selective 
discounts.75  Therefore, if an MFN clause deprives the market of innovative and 
alternative service delivery models, then the device may erect an unreasonable 
barrier to trade to the detriment of the market and ultimately consumers. 
9.  Deprives Consumers of Differentiated Products   
The complaint against Medical Mutual alleged that the insurer unreasonably 
restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act Section 1 by requiring hospitals, as 
sellers, to sign most favored rates (MFR) clauses.  Specifically, the United States 
alleged that the MFR clause had an anticompetitive effect on the market and as a 
result “businesses and consumers paid . . . higher than competitive prices and were 
deprived of innovative and less costly alternatives for health care services.”76  MFN 
clauses, therefore, operate to defeat the utilization of excess capacity by smaller 
insurers to create innovative, lower-cost products which would emerge in an 
otherwise free market to the benefit of the market and ultimately consumers.  
Therefore, the nature and magnitude of the actual anticompetitive purposes and 
effects caused by the implementation of an MFN clause will be balanced against the 
pro-competitive purposes and effects under the Sherman Act Section One’s the rule 
of reason.  If, on balance, the anticompetitive purposes and effects outweigh the pro-
competitive purposes and effects, then the court should conclude that the MFN 
device is a contract, combination or conspiracy that operates to unreasonably restrain 
trade to the detriment of consumers in violation of antitrust law under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. 
                                                                
 
71Celnicker, supra note 2, at 885 & n.137. 
72Id. at 885. 
73Id. at 890. 
74Id. at 869. 
75See id. at 870.  See United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
71,404 (D.D.C. 1996).  MFN clause has had the effect of reducing the scope of vision care 
coverage alternatives, such as managed care and other discount plans. 
76United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio 
1999). 
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III.  DEFEATING THE PRESUMPTIONS OF PRO-COMPETITIVENESS 
When the MFN clause was introduced to the health care industry, the device 
presumptively operated as a pro-competitive means to reduce restraints on trade 
because of the historical origins of MFN clauses.  The historical roots of the MFN 
clause are found in international trade agreements which have served as a 
mechanism to guard against protectionist trade barriers.77  The MFN’s concept was 
designed to reduce trade distortion through the prohibition of protectionist trade 
barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, which maximize global trade benefits through the 
creation of relatively free markets.78  In the historical context, the government, not 
the buyers and sellers within the market, implemented the MFN clause as a 
regulatory measure to eliminate protectionist tactics and to promote competition in 
free markets.  Based on principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination, MFN 
clauses promote competition in international trade, as well as in the arena of public 
utilities and multiparty litigation settlements.79 
Given their legacy, there should be no surprise that courts adopted the 
presumption that MFN clauses promote competition and reduce trade barriers.  The 
historical significance of the federal government, in its regulatory capacity rather 
than as a party to the contract, using the MFN clause to promote competition across 
several market sectors rather than in one specialized industry, distinguishes its 
historical application from its current use in health care.  In the health care industry, 
an insurer/buyer with sufficient market power, as a party to the contract within a 
specialized industry, exerts its market power to gain a competitive advantage.  
Exerting market power to gain a competitive advantage certainly does not, in and of 
itself violate antitrust law.  Rather, efforts to unreasonably restrain trade which have 
an anticompetitive effect on the whole market may violate antitrust laws.80  The 
courts should abandon the historical presumption of pro competition when an MFN 
clause is employed within one specialized industry by a party to the contract.81  The 
actual negative anticompetitive effects against the health care market defeat the 
historically-based presumption of pro-competitive purposes recognized in 
international trade.   Therefore, the presumption should be abolished in health care 
cases.  
IV.  U.S. CONSENT DECREES   
For many years large third party insurers, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
(BCBS), who used MFN clauses, enjoyed the presumption that the device served 
pro-competitive purposes.  During the 1980’s, federal and state courts alike rejected 
antitrust attacks on MFN clauses.82  Market competitors who challenged the use of 
                                                                
 
77Stenger, supra note 31, at 111. 
78Id. at 111-12. 
79Id. at 111. 
80United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996). 
81See Stenger, supra note 31, at 127-28.   
82Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 
1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990); Kitsap Physicians Serv. v. 
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the MFN clause alleging anticompetitive purposes or even “potential” 
anticompetitive effects under the Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 consistently lost.83  
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the United 
States Department of Justice were generally unwilling to challenge the use of MFN 
clauses in the health care industry.84   Subsequent to several investigations involving 
MFN clauses in which no action resulted, the head of the Antitrust Division stated in 
1988 that it was “unlikely” to challenge MFN clauses between third-party payers and 
medical providers.85  The prevailing view for years supported the proposition that 
MFN clauses are based primarily on the notion that is not only fair for the favored 
insurer to require a lowering of its price to meet a more favorable price extended to 
any other insurer, but also leads to lower prices throughout the market.86  The tide 
has only recently started to change as substantial evidence of actual negative 
anticompetitive effects pervade some local markets.   
Beginning in 1995, on five separate occasions against four separate insurers, 
where upon the U.S. Government filed a valid claim against the insurer, pursuant to 
alleged violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, each insurer has agreed to 
render its MFN clause unenforceable through the terms of a U.S. Consent Decree.87  
Medical Mutual of Ohio and Delta Dental of Rhode Island, discussed in detail below, 
exemplify the nature and magnitude of the anticompetitive purposes and effects 
caused by the MFN clause under the rule of reason analysis.88 
First, the United States of America filed its complaint alleging violations of the 
Sherman Act Section 1 in September of 1998, against Medical Mutual.89  The 
consent decree90 enjoins and restrains Medical Mutual from “adopting, maintaining, 
or enforcing,” a most favored rates (MFR) requirement or any other device having 
                                                          
 
Washington Dental Serv., 671 F. Supp. 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1987); Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Mich. v. Michigan Ass’n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 63,351 
(E.D. Mich. 1980); Madden v. California Dental Serv., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67, 176 
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1986). 
83Celnicker, supra note 2, at 864. 
84Id. at 864-65. 
85Id. at 865. 
86Id. at 865. 
87See supra note 22. 
88See supra note 22. 
89United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 30, 1999).  
90Id.  “[W]ithout a trial or final adjudication of any issue of fact or law,” the parties 
entered into a consent decree in January of 1999.  The United States, as plaintiff, and Medical 
Mutual of Ohio, as defendant, entered into U.S. Consent Decree in which Medical Mutual was 
prohibited from enforcing its most favored rate requirement.” 
The prohibited policy requires participating hospitals “to charge any [t]hird [p]arty 
[p]ayer[s] as much or more than the rate charged to Medical Mutual” or required a 
participating hospital “to charge Medical Mutual rates equal to or lower than the lowest rate it 
charges any [t]hird [p]arty [p]ayer.”  
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the “same purpose or effect.”91  Additionally, the consent decree enjoins and restrains 
Medical Mutual from “adopting, maintaining or enforcing any policy, practice, or 
agreement” that requires disclosure, by any means, of the rates that a participating 
hospital offers or accepts from other insurers, except when coordinating benefits 
with a specific claim.92  The effect of the consent decree is to render the MFR 
requirement null and void, imposing no obligation, on any participating hospital in 
the Cleveland Region.93 
A “competitive impact statement,” while not part of the final judgment, is 
included with the consent decree to “provide the information necessary to enable the 
Court and the public to evaluate the proposed [f]inal [j]udgment.”94  The competitive 
impact statement sets forth the evidence that the government had at the time the 
parties entered into the consent decree.  The competitive impact statement reveals 
that the complaint against Medical Mutual alleged that the insurer unreasonably 
restrained trade in violation of Sherman Act Section 1 by requiring hospitals, as 
sellers, to sign MFR clauses.  Specifically, the United States alleged that this MFR 
clause “had the effect of requiring those hospitals to charge Medical Mutual’s 
competitors significantly more than they charged Medical Mutual or pay substantial 
penalties.”95  Therefore, the Department of Justice felt that the penalties exacted for 
breaching the MFR agreement in addition to lowering the price to the most favored 
rate erected an unreasonable barrier to trade. 
Second, the United States filed suit against Delta Dental of Rhode Island alleging 
that the MFN clause in the insurer’s contracts with its dentists violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.  United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island was heard under a 
claim for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.96  Subsequent to the denial of the motion for dismissal, the parties entered 
into a consent decree.  The competitive impact statement alleged facts in evidence 
regarding the following anticompetitive conduct: exclusion of reduced-cost plans 
from the market; blocked market entry or expansion of several low-cost plans 
including withdrawal of such plans from the market; preventing discounted rates that 
would have significantly reduced or eliminated subscriber co-payments; a contract 
provision that added a financial penalty in addition to lowering the rate which acted 
as a deterrent to discounting to uninsured patients; no meaningful savings or other 
pro-competitive benefits have been realized by Delta subscribers; and, by effectively 
setting the price floor, Delta has raised the cost of dental services and dental 
insurance for Rhode Island consumers.97 
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V.  INDICIA OF A MERITORIOUS CLAIM AGAINST AN INSURER EMPLOYING AN MFN 
CLAUSE UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT   
As the tide begins to change, indicia of meritorious claims are beginning to 
emerge which can serve as a guide both to structure the parties and the nature of the 
claim and to assess the relative merits of the claim.  Emerging indicia of a 
meritorious claim for injunctive relief against an MFN insurer may include: a 
Sherman Act Section 1 complaint where the rule of reason is applied; an MFN clause 
which imposes an automatic reduction in price, and sometimes more egregiously 
imposes a monetary penalty in addition to lowering the price; implementation of the 
MFN clause by an insurer with sufficient market power; de facto intra-market use of 
the MFN clause; an anticompetitive injury in fact which is causally related to the 
MFN clause; and, an action brought by a plaintiff who is not party to the MFN 
contract. 
A.  Claims Brought Under the Sherman Act Section 1   
Sherman Act Section 1 states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”98  Because any agreement 
concerning trade can restrain competition, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 
1 to “render unlawful only those restraints of trade that unreasonably restrict 
competition.”99  The Section 1 claim, as opposed to a Section 2 claim, captures the 
essence of how the MFN clause operates.100  The MFN clause is typically part of a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy which unreasonably restrains trade when the 
anticompetitive purposes and effects outweigh the pro-competitive purposes and 
effects under the rule of reason.   
B.  MFN Clause-automatic Reduction in Price, and Monetary Penalty in Addition to 
Lowering Price  
Medical Mutual’s MFR clause compelled any non-governmental insurer with a 
“lower total dollar volume” to pay rates equal to or higher than Medical Mutual.101  
Additionally, the agreement required hospitals to maintain a 15-30% differential 
between the rates charged to Medical Mutual and all other smaller commercial 
insurers.102  This percentage differential created a significant cost advantage over its 
competitors purchasing hospital services.103   
                                                                
 
98See the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
99United States v. Delta Dental of R. I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D. R.I. 1996). 
100See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
101United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,465 (N.D. Ohio 
Sept. 30, 1998). 
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103Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 32, at *80.  “MFN contract 
clauses can establish a price floor with respect to the overall cost of all health insurance 
products offered in that market.  A health plan’s overall expenses determine in large part the 
price it will charge for all of its health insurance products.  The cost of delivering medical care 
constitutes most of a health plan’s costs in offering health insurance products.  If an MFN 
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Medical Mutual enforced its MFR clause and percentage differential provision 
with the express dual “purpose of protecting it against competition and significantly 
raising its competitor’s hospital costs.”104  A hospital’s violation of the percentage 
differential provision had devastating financial effects which exacted huge 
penalties.105  A hospital who failed to maintain the percentage differential even when 
the breach occurred as result of a discount awarded to a competitor for case mix or 
utilization management paid the penalty.106  For example, Medical Mutual assessed a 
penalty of $342,916 against a participating hospital for giving a competitor a 
discount below Medical Mutual totaling $13,831.107  The increased costs of hospital 
services to other insurers and consumers harmed competition in the health care 
market as opposed to harming one or two competitors.108   
The complaint also alleged that Medical Mutual’s MFR clause and percentage 
differential rate caused competitors to enter complicated and costly contractual 
arrangements, called “stop-loss” provisions, to avoid triggering the MFR penalties.109  
The U.S. Government contended that these additional costs were borne by 
competitors and ultimately consumers.  Therefore, an especially egregious MFR 
clause which exacts a monetary penalty in addition to lowering prices to the most 
favored rate raises red flags as an onerous restraint on trade.  
C.  Sufficient Market Power 
The head of the Antitrust Division in 1988 stated that when the insurer controls at 
least thirty-five percent of the business in the relevant market further analysis is 
warranted.110  In assessing the competitive effects, the Division will inquire whether 
the imposed clause was motivated by factors other than the desire to get the best 
price possible and whether there is sufficient excess capacity for new insurers to 
enter the market.111 
Earlier cases failed to account for the significance of an insurer with sufficient 
market power using the MFN clause to defeat competition.  A closer look, however, 
reveals that earlier holdings reflect an insufficiency of evidence, particularly 
                                                          
 
clause sets a price floor for a particular type of medical service, then it also indirectly operates 
to establish a price floor with respect to the ultimate price of all products . . ..  [T]he largest 
single expense item for any  health plan is typically hospital costs.” 
104United States v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, No. 1:98 CV2172, 1999 WL 670717, at *6 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 1999). 
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108Id.  Many hospital systems including MetroHealth, the Cleveland Clinic, University, 
Meridia, Lake, Marymount, Southwest General, Mt. Sinai, and Fairview were all deterred 
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110Celnicker, supra note 2, at 865. 
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evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, rather than dismissal of market power as a 
relevant factor under Section 1 analysis.  Kartell is one such example of insufficient 
evidence of anticompetitive effects.  After declaring that Blue Shield was merely 
acting as a rational buyer, the First Circuit, in the Kartell case, stated the general 
antitrust principle that the “law rarely stops the buyer of a service from trying to 
determine the price or characteristics of the product that will be sold.”112  Even if 
Blue Shield possessed sufficient market power and used that power to obtain lower 
than competitive prices, the “antitrust laws interfere with a firm’s freedom to set 
even uncompetitive prices only in special circumstances,” that is, where the price is 
predatory (below incremental cost).113 
More recent cases, in contrast, give credence to the effect market power can have 
on competition.  Under the rule of reason analysis, the Delta Dental court considered 
“significant market power” as one factor in balancing the effects on competition.114  
Armed with significant market power, a plausible allegation is made, that “Delta 
applies its MFN [clause] selectively to block alternative reduced-fee plans from the 
dental insurance market, but has discerned no discernable cost savings.”  
Furthermore, the government alleged that the “practice has sustained or increased 
consumer dental costs in the form of premiums” without any perceived competitive 
benefits.115 
D.  Intra-market Use of the MFN Clause 
Use of the MFN clause in the health care industry is de facto intra-market use of 
the device.  As the historical origins of MFN clauses show, the device is pro-
competitive when implemented by the government, a non-party to the contract, to 
reduce existing trade barriers.116  MFN clauses, even absent allegations of predatory 
pricing, “discourage discounting, facilitate oligopolistic pricing, and deter entry or 
expansion by more efficient distribution systems” when implemented within one 
market sector.117  The historical basis underlying the presumption of the pro-
competitive nature of MFN clauses quickly erodes when one distinguishes its current 
use in health care from its historical origins.  Therefore, when the MFN clause is 
implemented by the parties to the contract, combination, or conspiracy, within one 
specialized industry such as health care, where no existing trade barrier is present, 
the historical presumption of pro-competitive purposes and effects crumbles.   
                                                                
 
112Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir. 1984). 
113Id. at 927. 
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E.  Anticompetitive Injury in Fact Which is Causally Related to the MFN Clause 
The injury must have an anticompetitive effect on the health care market rather 
than one or two competitors.118  (Anticompetitive injury to market competitors 
ultimately causing higher health care costs, fewer choices among providers and 
reduced access to medical services that unreasonably harms subscribers). 
The best evidence shows that by comparison of the market’s status either prior to 
or in isolated cases after the MFN clause was rendered unenforceable, the MFN 
competitors paid lower rates to medical providers, consumers had lower health care 
costs, more choices among providers, and greater access to medical services.119  For 
example, in cases where Medical Mutual’s MFR clause was inapplicable under the 
terms of the agreement, the hospitals willingly offered lower rates to Medical 
Mutual’s competitors.120  Such examples highlight the “but for” causal link between 
the MFR clause and its restraint on price competition which harms consumers.   
F.  Party Posture 
Any Sherman Act Section 1 claim is less likely to succeed if brought by a party 
to the contract, combination or conspiracy.  Actions brought by competing insurers, 
subscribers, or the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division are more likely to 
succeed under a Section 1 claim.   
Although Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts involves a ban on balance 
billing provision, as opposed to an MFN clause, the case is instructive regarding 
party posture when bringing a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.  In Kartell v. Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts, the Kartell physicians were party to the Blue Shield 
contract.121  Here, the Kartell physicians sued Blue Shield under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act alleging that the ban on balance billing practice unreasonably 
restrained trade.  A ban on balance billing agreement requires the physicians to 
forego additional charges to subscribers in return for direct payment.  The same 
physicians who voluntarily contracted with Blue Shield to refrain from billing any 
additional payments to subscribers brought suit against Blue Shield.   
Section 1 requires “a contract, combination, or conspiracy” to restrain trade.  
Because Kartell is party to the contract which allegedly restrained trade, and 
introduced no supportable evidence of any other contract, combination, or 
conspiracy, to the allegedly unlawful method used to restrain trade, Kartell cannot 
win under traditional Section 1 analysis.  Either Kartell participated in an unlawful 
contract to restrain trade by agreeing to the ban on balance billing, or Kartell lacked 
an essential element of proving the Section 1 claim for want of a “contract, 
combination, or conspiracy.”  Therefore, the identity of the adverse parties to this 
lawsuit, who are the same parties on opposite sides of the contractual agreement, 
precludes the physicians from proving the existence of “a contract, combination, or 
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conspiracy” that places an unreasonable restraint on trade without simultaneously 
proving their own illegal conduct.  
The party posture in Kartell, therefore, demands “unilateral activity” by Blue 
Shield.122  As such, the First Circuit articulated an alternative premise on which the 
physicians, as a party to the contract with the billing provision which allegedly 
restrained trade, could prevail under a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.  The First 
Circuit reasoned that to find an unlawful restraint on trade, Blue Shield would have 
to be viewed as a “third force” intervening in the marketplace to prevent willing 
buyers and sellers from coming together to strike a bargain based upon price and 
quality.123  Antitrust law “frowns upon behavior” that erects a barrier to otherwise 
independent bargains.124  If, as the district court posits, the medical provider is the 
seller and the subscriber is the buyer, then Blue Shield can be viewed as the third 
force.  The First Circuit concluded, however, that Blue Shield was not an inhibitory 
“third force,” rather Blue Shield operated as the purchaser of services.125  Blue 
Shield, as a commercial insurance purchaser, essentially “buys medical services for 
the account of others.”126  Therefore, even under the third force theory, the antitrust 
plaintiff still fails to satisfy an element of the cause of action when the antitrust 
defendant is perceived as the buyer rather than a third force in the market. 
In contrast, Delta Dental was brought by the United States Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division.  Delta Dental teaches that an insurer who contends his activity is 
“merely unilateral” when each participating dentist accepts Delta’s terms in adopting 
the prudent buyer clause can be defeated by the express agreement itself.127  
“Although the Supreme Court has recognized that Section 1 does not reach conduct 
that is ‘wholly unilateral,’128 concerted action may be amply demonstrated by an 
express agreement.”129  Each dentist explicitly agreed to comply with Delta Dental’s 
agreement, including the prudent buyer clause.  The court concluded that the 
requisite concerted action to satisfy the element of conspiracy between two parties 
was clearly alleged to defeat the motion for dismissal.130  Clearly, the district court’s 
analysis should concern any medical provider, in addition to any insurer, who 
participates through a contract, combination, or conspiracy to implement an MFN 
clause.  Both parties to the contract, as opposed to only the MFN insurer, may be 
charged with unlawfully restraining trade in violation of antitrust law.131  Therefore, 
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acquiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman Act132 as the 
creation or promotion of one.133 
Furthermore, any medical provider who brings a Section 1 claim and prevails 
must be concerned whether the antitrust defendant will then refuse payment for any 
outstanding amounts of money owed to the medical provider under a contract which 
is declared illegal by the court.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court has said that 
where there has been a sale of goods at a contract price, payment cannot be avoided 
on the plea that the transaction was part of a plan to violate the Sherman Act.134  On 
the other hand, where enforcement of a contract by the court would involve 
effectuating conduct that is unlawful under the antitrust laws, enforcement will be 
denied.135  Therefore, the medical provider, as a party to the MFN contract, who 
prevails on judgment rendering the clause an unlawful restraint on trade, at least 
risks losing any outstanding payments due for services performed under the unlawful 
contract. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Government, corporations offering employer-based health insurance, 
and American citizens as consumers of health care all have reason for serious 
concern regarding the anticompetitive nature of MFN clauses.  These clauses have 
the effect of unnecessarily raising consumer costs for health insurance, reducing 
choice among providers, constraining access to care, and preventing the development 
of alternative health care delivery models.  Three recommendations emerge based 
upon the current use and anticompetitive effects of MFN clauses in the health care 
market. 
First, the antitrust plaintiff, who brings an action alleging Sherman Act Section 1 
violations, can evaluate the merits of his claim in light of his factual evidence of pro-
competitive purposes and effects versus anticompetitive purposes and effects as 
analyzed in this paper.   Second, the courts should abolish the presumption of the 
pro-competitive nature of MFN clauses in health care because the historical origins 
which created the pro-competitive presumption bear no resemblance to their current 
application in health care.  Third, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
should litigate at least one Sherman Act Section 1 claim involving an MFN clause to 
establish precedent that, at least in some cases, MFN clauses may unlawfully restrain 
trade.  Fourth, the antitrust plaintiff can review the indicia of a meritorious claim 
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defined in this paper as a benchmark assessment of the relative strength of their 
claim compared to those in which MFN insurers entered U.S. Consent Decrees 
rendering their MFN clause null and void.   
